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Abstract. In this paper we present a new model, called NorMAS-RE, for the re-
quirements analysis of a system. NorMAS-RE is a new model based on the mul-
tiagent systems paradigm with the aim to support the requirements analysis phase
of systems design. This model offers a structured approach to requirements anal-
ysis, based on conceptual models defined following a visual modeling language,
called dependence networks. The main elements of this visual language are the
agents with their goals, capabilities and facts, similarly to the TROPOS method-
ology [10]. The normative component is present both in the ontology and in the
conceptual metamodel, associating agents to roles they play inside the systems
and a set of goals, capabilities and facts proper of these roles. This improvement
allows to define different types of dependence networks, called dynamic depen-
dence networks and conditional dependence networks, representing the different
phases of the requirements analysis of the system. This paper presents a require-
ments analysis model based on normative concepts such as obligation and insti-
tution. The NorMAS-RE model is a model of semiformal specification featured
by an ontology, a meta-model, a graphical notation and a set of constraints. Our
model, moreover, allows the definition of the notion of coalition for the different
kinds of network. We present our model using the scenario of virtual organiza-
tions based on a Grid network.
1 Introduction
The diffusion of software applications in the fields of e-Science and e-Research un-
derlines the necessity to develop open architectures, able to evolve and include new
software components. In the late years, the process of design of these software systems
became more complex. The definition of appropriate mechanisms of communication
and coordination between software components and human users motivates the devel-
opment of methods with the aim to support the designer for the whole development
process of the software, from the requirements analysis to the implementation.
The answer to this problem comes from software engineering that provided nu-
merous methods and methodologies allowing to treat more complex software systems.
One of these methodologies is the TROPOS methodology [10], developed for agent-
oriented design of software systems. The intuition of the TROPOS methodology [10] is
to couple, together with the instruments offered by software engineering, the multiagent
paradigm. In this paradigm, the entities composing the system are agent, autonomous by
definition, characterized by their own sets of goals, capabilities and beliefs. The multia-
gent paradigm allows the cooperation among the agents with the aim to obtain common
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and personal goals. In this way, multiagent systems offer a solution for open, distributed
and complex systems and the approach combining software engineering and multiagent
systems is defined Agent-Oriented Software Engineering (AOSE). TROPOS [10] cov-
ers five phases of the software development process: the early requirements allowing to
analyze and model the requirements of the context in which the software system will be
inserted, late requirements describing the requirements of the software system, archi-
tectural design and detailed design aiming to design the architecture of the system and,
finally, the code implementation.
The TROPOS methodology [10] is based on the multiagent paradigm consisting in
a set of agents and their features but it does not consider the addition of a normative
perspective to this paradigm. Since twenty years, the design of artificial social systems
is using mechanisms like social laws and norms to control the behavior of multiagent
systems [5]. These social concepts are used in the conceptual modeling of multiagent
systems, for example in requirement analysis, as well as in formal analysis and agent
based social simulation. For example, in the game theoretic approach of Shoham and
Tennenholtz [28], social laws are constraints on sets of strategies. Together with the
rationality assumptions of classical game theory, this leads to the analysis of, for ex-
ample, stable or minimal social laws, which can be used to choose the best alternative
among a set of available social laws. More recently, institutions have emerged as a new
mechanism in the design of artificial social systems, which are used in conceptual mod-
eling of multiagent organizations in agent oriented software engineering [37]. Roughly
speaking, institutions are structures and mechanisms of social order and cooperation
governing the behavior of a set of individuals. They are needed to enforce the global
behaviour of the society and to assure that the global goals of the society are met. How-
ever, the formal analysis of the institutions is challenging due to the complexity of its
dynamics. For example, the agents may change the roles they are playing, or the in-
stitution itself may change over time due to the behavior of the agents. Requirements
analysis represents the initial phase in many software engineering methodologies. As
with the other approaches, the ultimate objective of requirements analysis is to provide
a set of functional and non-functional requirements for the system to be. In this paper,
we propose to add institutions and norms, presented thanks to the normative multia-
gent paradigm, to the requirements analysis phase. This paper addresses the following
research question:
– How to develop a new model for requirements analysis based on the normative
multiagent paradigm?
Our approach is based, following the approach of TROPOS [10], on a semiformal
language of visual modeling and it is composed by the following components. First, we
present an ontology that defines the set of concepts used in the modeling. The elements
composing the ontology are agents, goals, facts, skills, dependencies, coalitions with the
addition of the normative notions of roles, institutional goals, institutional facts, institu-
tional skills, dynamic dependencies, obligations, sanctions, secondary obligations and
conditional dependencies. Second, our meta-model is specified by a number of UML
diagrams. These diagrams and the graphical notation establish how to graphically de-
pict the elements composing models. A NorMAS-RE model is a directed labeled graph
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whose nodes are instances of the metaclasses of the metamodel, e.g., agents, goals,
facts, and whose arcs are instances of the metaclasses representing relationships be-
tween them such as dependency, dynamic dependency, conditional dependency. Finally,
we have a set of rules and constraints to guide the building of a conceptual metamodel.
In TROPOS [10], the requirements analysis is split in two main phases, the early re-
quirements and the late requirements. In our model, these two phases share the same
conceptual and methodological approach, thus we call both of them only requirements
analysis.
We provide the abstract notion of institution and a definition of a new modeling,
called dynamic dependency modeling, based on the structure of dynamic dependence
networks. These networks, as classical dependence networks, depict the dependencies
among the agents. The dependencies reflect the relation between the goals of agents and
agents who have the power to achieve them. In the institutional perspective, institutional
powers cannot be captured by the existing dependence networks formalism, since they
introduce a dynamic component. Institutional powers can change the norms and per-
missions of agents playing roles, and, thus, by exercising a power an agent transforms
a dependence structure into a new one by adding or removing dependencies thanks to
the concepts present into the institutional level of the ontology. Thus, power is seen as
the base of the change that is applied to the network describing the system, differently
from what expresses by Jones and Sergot [20] and Grossi [19]. By exercising an insti-
tutional power, an agent transforms a dependence structure into a new one by adding or
removing dependencies associated to the institutional concepts. Moreover, we introduce
the normative issue of obligations, representing them directly in dependence networks.
This introduction allows the definition of a third kind of modeling called conditional
dependency modeling based on the structure of conditional dependence networks. Con-
ditional dependence networks represent obligations as particular kind of dependencies
and these obligations are related to notions as sanctions, if the obligation is not fulfilled,
and as contrary to duty when the primary obligation, not fulfilled, actives a secondary
obligation.
A coalition is an alliance among agents, during which they cooperate in joint ac-
tion, each one following his own self-interest. We define the notion of coalition in de-
pendence networks, based on the idea that to be part of a coalition, every agent has to
contribute something, and has to get something out of it. Since the processes involv-
ing coalitions dynamics are complex and costly social behaviors, the idea is that agents
have to maintain the stability of their own coalition, paying attention to the possible
actions that can be performed by the other agents to strategically increase their profit,
mining the coalition or, even worse, destroying the coalition itself. To maintain sta-
bility, coalitions have to change dynamically. The possibility to represent coalitions is
relevant for systems design and, in particular, for the requirements analysis where the
different components of the system can have the necessity to cooperate in a preferen-
tial way with a specific subset of other components. The aim of requirements analysis
in this context consists in the definition of models able to represent these groups and
to provide methods to maintain the stability and the cohesion of these groups. The in-
troduction of methods of social order such as obligations and sanctions represents an
efficient way to achieve this purpose.
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Our model is not intended to support all analysis and design activities in software
development process, from application domain analysis down to the system implemen-
tation as in the TROPOS methodology [10]. Moreover, we do not perform any kind of
simulation as in the recent developments of social network analysis called dynamic net-
works analysis as in Carley [12]. Finally, the treatment of a topic like contrary to duty
does not concern any connection with deontic logic approaches to solve and analyze
this structure such as in Prakken and Sergot [23].
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a Grid computing scenario as
case study for the design of virtual organizations for e-Science and e-Research. In Sec-
tion 3, we present the core concepts of the ontology and their inter-relations. In Section
4, we define the structure of dynamic dependence networks and we introduce the notion
of coalition in this kind of network. Section 5 presents a new kind of dependence net-
work, called conditional dependence network, introducing some constraints that have
to be set for representing coalitions in the conditional dependency modeling. A notion
of coalitions’ stability is defined and a discussion on the this issue is presented. Related
work and conclusions end the paper.
2 The Grid Scenario
Grids and the Grid Computing paradigm provide the technological infrastructure to
facilitate e-Science and e-Research. Grid technologies can support a wide range of re-
search including amongst others: seamless access to a range of computational resources,
linkage of a wide range of data resources, exploitation of shared instruments such as
astronomical telescopes or specialized resources such as visualization servers. Histori-
cally, much of the focus and effort of Grid computing was based upon addressing access
to and usage of large scale high performance computing (HPC) resources such as cluster
computers. These access models are typified by their predominantly authentication-only
based approaches which support secure access to an account on a cluster. It is often the
case that research domains and resource providers require more information than sim-
ply the identity of the individual in order to grant access to use their resources. The
same individual can be in multiple collaborative projects each of which is based upon a
common shared infrastructure. Knowing in what context a user is requesting access to
a particular resource is essential information for a resource provider to decide whether
the access request should be granted or not. This information is typically established
through the concept of a virtual organization (VO) [32]. A virtual organization allows
the users, their roles and the resources they can access in a collaborative project to be
defined.
In the context of virtual organizations, there are numerous technologies and stan-
dards that have been put forward for defining and enforcing authorization policies
for access to and usage of virtual organizations resources. Role based access control
(RBAC) is one of the more well established models for describing such policies. In the
RBAC model, virtual organization specific roles are assigned to individuals as part of
their membership of a particular virtual organization. Possession of a particular role,
combined with other context information, such as time of day and amount of resource
being requested, can then be used by a resource gatekeeper to decide whether an ac-
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Fig. 1. A Grid composed by six nodes and the interconnections among them.
cess request is allowed or not. One of the key advantages is that whilst individuals in
a virtual organization may come and go, the role itself is unlikely to change as much.
Consequently RBAC based approaches are considered more scalable and manageable.
The key advantage of RBAC-based security models compared to other approaches is
that privileges and access is determined by roles and memberships a user holds and
not merely on identity. Indeed the common philosophy underlying the Grid is that all
resource providers are expected to be autonomous, i.e. they may allow/deny access re-
quests at their own discretion. Nevertheless, a crucial consideration in establishing a
virtual organization is whether a common understanding of the various roles and their
associated privileges needs to be established throughout the entire virtual organization
or not.
There are two primary models for defining roles specific to a virtual organization:
the centralized and decentralized models [32]. In the centralized model, all sites agree
in advance on the definition and names of the roles that are applicable to their particular
virtual organization, and the privileges that will be assigned to them. A single virtual
organization administrator is then appointed who will typically assign these roles to
individuals on a case by case basis when users ask to be granted particular roles or per-
missions in the virtual organization. The decentralized virtual organization role model
is more aligned with the original dynamic collaborative nature of the Grid. In this model
there is no central virtual organization administrator. Instead, each resource site has its
own local administrator who is completely responsible for determining which virtual
organization members can access the local virtual organization resources. Each site ad-
ministrator determines the roles and the associated privileges that are required to access
and use the local resources. Consequently, they can decide which other administrators
(at this and other virtual organization sites) are trusted to assign which roles to which
virtual organization users. In this way they may each delegate to each other the re-
sponsibility of user-role assignments throughout the virtual organization. This model
allows for more dynamic collaborations to occur. Thus rather than all sites having to
agree on virtual organization-wide roles and develop associated policies, the decentral-
ized model allows a resource administrator to directly provide end users and trusted end
user administrators with the privileges they need to enable access to his resource.
Role based access control systems make access control decisions based on the roles
that users hold. Traditional output of the access control decisions are Granted and De-
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nied, which dictate whether the requests are authorized or not. As presented by Zhao et
al. [38], obligations are requirements and tasks to be fulfilled, which can be augmented
into conventional systems to allow extras information to be specified when responding
to authorization requests. For example in [38], administrators can associate obligations
with permissions, and require the fulfillment of the obligations when the permissions
are exercised. The base model associated users with roles, and roles with permissions.
Users, being members of roles, acquired all permissions associated with the roles. The
hierarchical model enhanced the base model by allowing senior roles to acquire per-
missions of their junior roles. The general idea of the role based access control model is
that, permissions are associated with functional roles in organizations, and members of
the roles acquire all permissions associated with the roles. Allocation of permission to
users is achieved by assigning roles to users. An obligation is associated with privileges,
and when an operation is performed, the obligation associated to the privilege which au-
thorizes the operation is activated. Obligations are requirements to be performed by a
specific deadline. Failure of the fulfilling an obligation will incur a sanction.
Some of the main features of a node in a Grid are reliability, degree of accepted
requests, computational capabilities, degree of faults and degree of trust for confidential
data. These different features set up important differences among the nodes and the
possible kinds of coalitions that can be formed and maintained. In this scenario, as in
the following examples, we do not consider the way the coalitions are formed but we
are interested in coalitions’ evolution. We think of already formed coalitions and we
discuss the notion of stability and the possible ways to regulate these coalitions thanks
to the use of obligations. The idea is that coalitions emerge thanks to the preferred
relationships among the different nodes, e.g., each node maintains a sort of list of the
more trusted nodes forming a coalition with it. Reciprocity-based coalitions can be
viewed as a sort of virtual organizations in which there is the constraint that each node
has to contribute something, and has to get something out of it. For example, in a virtual
organization each node has to be useful to the other and thus it has to have at least one
of the previous cited features.
The scenario of virtual organizations based on Grid networks represents a case study
able to underline the benefits of a normative multiagent paradigm for requirements anal-
ysis. First of all, in the normative multiagent paradigm as well as in the common mul-
tiagent one, the autonomy of agents is the fix point of all representations, i.e., the Grid
philosophy imposes the autonomy of the nodes composing it. Second, the normative
multiagent paradigm allows a clear definition of the notion or role and its associated
permissions, i.e. the role based access control policy needs a design able to assign roles
and represents all the consequent constraints based on them. Third, the normative mul-
tiagent paradigm allows the introduction at requirements analysis level of obligations
able to model the system. Fourth, the concept of coalition and the constraints introduced
by this concept to the early and late requirements model can design the concept of “lo-
cal network" in virtual organizations. Finally, the modeling activities of dependency
modeling, dynamic dependency modeling and conditional dependency modeling depict
the system using structures similar to the Grid network itself.
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3 Institutional MAS: agents, roles and assignments
Since last years, many factors have caused a great increase of the complexity of soft-
ware systems. Applications such as e-commerce, e-services, e-science, e-research are
clear example of this kind. The software for these applications has to be based on open
architectures and it has to evolve over time to integrate new hardware components and
answer to the necessity of new requirements. Our model is addressed to the representa-
tion of the requirements of the system using the normative multiagent paradigm. This
model is based firstly on an ontology containing a number of concepts related to each
other. We divide our ontology in three submodels: the agent model, the institutional
model, and the role assignment model, as shown in Figure 2. The Figure depicts the
three submodels which group the concepts of our ontology.
Fig. 2. The NorMAS-RE conceptual metamodel.
Such a decomposition is common in organizational theory, because the organiza-
tion can be designed without having to take into account the agents that will play a role
in it. Also, if another agent starts to play a role, for example if a node with the role of
simple user becomes a VO administrator, then this remains transparent for the organiza-
tional model. Likewise, agents can be developed without knowing in advance in which
institution they will play a role.
The notion of agent and all its features as goals, capabilities, are used in the concep-
tual modeling as in TROPOS [10]. In our model, we add to these notions those related
to the institution such as the notion of role and all its institutional goals, capabilities and
facts. Both these notions, combined in the combined view, are used in the conceptual
modeling and to each agents it is possible to assign different roles depending on the
organization in which the agent is playing. Adding the institution, to each agent are as-
sociated both a number of physical features and a role with all its institutional features.
In this way, early and late requirements can be based both on agents and on roles. The
models in NorMAS-RE are acquired as instances of a conceptual metamodel resting on
the concepts presented in the following subsections. We present our three submodels as




An agent can be defined as an entity characterized by a number of features as his capa-
bilities, called skills, his world description and his goals, such as the tasks he want to
achieve. The representation of the system from a material point of view, called Agent
view, can be imagined as composed by a set of agents, each of them with its associated
sets of skills and goals and a set of actions, a set of facts describing the world and a set
of rules that allow the application of an action by an agent that can perform it and the
consequences of the action on the system. The definition of the agent view is as follows:
Definition 1 (Agent view).
〈A,F,G,X, goals : A → 2G, skills : A → 2X , rules : 2X → 2G〉 consists of a set
of agents A, a set of facts F , a set of goals G, a set of actions X , a function goals
that relates with each agent the set of goals it is interested in, a function skills that
describes the actions each agent can perform, and a set of rules, represented by the
function rules that relate sets of actions with the sets of goals they see to.
Example 1. Considering a virtual organization on a Grid with a role based access con-
trol policy, the agent view is used to describe the set of legitimate users of the system,
represented inside the Grid as nodes. Each user is provided by a set of actions he can do,
represented by the set X , e.g., to save a file on his file system or to start a computation
on his personal computer, and by a set of goals he would fulfill, represented as the set
G, e.g., he wants to reserve half of his available memory for his data or he has to obtain
the result of a computation in two hours. These actions X can be compared to the op-
erations that are recognized by the system. Functions goals and skills link each agent
with the actions he can perform and with the goals he would obtain. Function rules is
a sort of action-consequence function, relating sets of actions with the goals they allow
to fulfill, e.g., to obtain the results of a computation in two hours, the user has to start
the computation on his personal computer.
3.2 Institutional View
A social structure is modeled as a collection of agents, playing roles regulated by norms
where “interactions are clearly identified and localized in the definition of the role itself"
[37]. The notion of role is notable in many fields of Artificial Intelligence and, partic-
ularly, in multiagent systems where the role is viewed as an instance to be adjoined to
the entities which play the role. According to Ferber [17], “A role describes the con-
straints (obligations, requirements, skills) that an agent will have to satisfy a role, the
benefits (abilities, authorizations, profits) that an agent will receive in playing that role,
and the responsibilities associated to that role". In TROPOS [10], the role is one of the
three specification of the concept of actor and it is an abstract characterization of the
behaviour of the social actor inside the specific context of the application domain. In the
NorMAS-RE model the notion of role is inserted into the submodel called institutional
view. The institutional view is defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Institutional view).
〈RL, IF,RG,X, igoals : RL → 2RG, iskills : RL → 2X , irules : 2X → 2IF 〉
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consists of a set of role instances RL, a set of institutional facts IF , a set of public
goals attributed to roles RG, a set of actions X , a function igoals that relates with
each role the set of public goals it is committed to, a function iskills that describes the
actions each role can perform, and a set of institutional rules irules that relates a set
of actions and the set of institutional facts they see to.
Example 2. The institutional view represents in the Grid scenario a sort of model for the
role based access control policy. In fact, this view represents all the possible roles that
can be instantiated in the system and all the possible actions and goals related to each
of these roles. For example, we can think to a Grid system with the two basic roles of
virtual organization administrator and virtual organization member. These two roles are
different depending on the actions they can perform. For example, the VO administrator
has the possibility to assign to the VO members the privileges they need to enable access
to its resource. Our approach gives the opportunity to define not only the capabilities of
a particular role but it allows also the definition of institutional goals associated to roles,
differently from other approaches such as [38] [32]. The institutional view is a way to
represent permissions of the users of the system. Users, being assigned to a particular
role, acquire all permissions (in this view represented as rules by the function irules)
associated to the role. In this way, the allocation of permissions to users is achieved
by assigning roles to users. In the Grid computing field, a permission is an approval of
performing an operation on a specific target. In our model, we represent a permission in
a virtual organization as the actions that a role can perform and what kind of goals these
actions allow to achieve. For example, a user asks for saving a file on the file system of
another node. This user is associated to a role, since he belongs to a virtual organization
regulated by a role based access control policy. The request can be processed either
by the local VO administrator or by the user that has received the request. If the user
requesting the service has a role that can perform this action, the request is accepted and
the file is saved. In this case, we consider for simplicity the case in which the request
is always accepted if the role has the permission to do it without thinking of malicious
behaviours.
3.3 Role Assignment View
In TROPOS [10], the position of the actor represents a set of roles played by a single
agent. In our model, we introduce the third submodel,the Role assignment view, which
links the agent and the institutional view to each other, by relating agents to roles.
Definition 3 (Assignment view).
〈A,RL, roles : RL → A〉 consists of a set of agents A, a set of role instances RL, and
a function roles assigning a role to its player in A.
Example 3. The assignment view relates each agent with the role it is associated with.
In virtual organizations, this kind of assignments is done by the VO administrator, in
the centralize model, and by the VO local administrators, in the decentralized model.
In our model, there is not a constraint on what kind of agent has the power to assign
roles and thus privileges to the users. The assignment view can be eventually restricted
to one of the two cases of centralized and decentralized model.
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3.4 Combined View
In NorMAS-RE, the system is provided with two distinct views, the material one, called
the agent view, and the institutional one, called institutional view, that aims to regulate
the behaviour of the agents and to presents the permissions associated to each role.
Usually, in a multiagent system each agent is related to a set of facts and goals the
other agents cannot change since all the agents are autonomous. All these features are
presented in the concepts of the agent view. But a multiagent system is composed by a
multitude of agent that, thanks to their existence inside a social structure, are provided
by new sets of facts and goals, the institutional ones, representing permissions. Permis-
sions are allocated to roles and it is specified by the institutional view. The combined
view unifies the agent view and the institutional view thanks to the assignment view
providing thus the combined and unified conceptual metamodel:
Definition 4 (Combined view).
Let 〈A,RL, roles : RL → A〉 be a role assignment view for the agents and role in-
stances defined in the agent view 〈A,F,G,X, goals : A → 2G, skills : A → 2X , rules :
2X → 2G〉 and institutional view 〈RL, IF,RG,X, igoals : RL → 2RG, iskills :
RL → 2X , irules : 2X → 2IF 〉. The role playing agents are RPA = {〈a, r〉 ∈
A × RL | r ∈ roles(a))}. The combined view associates with the role playing agents
the elements of the agent and institutional view.
Example 4. The agents start with their sets of personal beliefs and goals and, only after
their insertion inside a social structure, they enlarge their sets of goals and beliefs.
In particular, the set of goals is enlarged with new normative goals that represent the
responsibilities of the agent inside its social structure while the set of beliefs is enlarged
with new normative beliefs representing the set of constitutive norms of the systems,
norms based on the collective acceptance of the society representable by means of an
institutional ontology.
3.5 Dependency Modeling
A NorMAS-RE model is a directed labeled graph whose nodes are instances of the
metaclasses of the metamodel, e.g., agents, goals, facts, and whose arcs are instances
of the metaclasses representing relationships between them such as dependency, dy-
namic dependency, conditional dependency. The building of a model in NorMAS-RE
involves many activities contributing to the process of definition of the model itself.
Our modeling is based on the theory of the social power and dependence pioneered by
Castelfranchi [14] as starting point and then developed in the context of coalition for-
mation by Sichman [29] and Sauro [25]. The theory of social power and dependence is
an attempt to transfer theories developed initially in the field of sociology to the field
of multiagent systems and to refine them. This theory models the potential interactions
among the agents which lead to the achievement of a shared goal, i.e. cooperation, or
the reciprocal satisfaction of their own goals, i.e. social exchange. This involves the de-
velopment of a social reasoning mechanism that analyzes the possibility to profit from
mutual-dependencies, e.g., the case in which two agents depend on each other for the
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satisfaction of a shared goal, or reciprocal-dependencies, e.g., the case in which two
agents depend on each other for the satisfaction of two different goals.
In a multiagent system, since an agent is put into a system that involves also other
agents, he can be supported by the others to achieve his own goals if he is not able to do
them alone. This leads to the concept of power representing the capability of a group of
agents (possibly composed only by one agent) to achieve some goals (theirs or of other
agents) performing some actions without the possibility to be obstructed. The power of
a group of agents is defined as follows:
Definition 5 (Agents’ power).
〈A,G, power : 2A → 22
G
〉 where A is a set of agents, G is a set of goals. The function
power relates with each set S ⊆ A of agents the sets of goals G1
S




Example 5. In the Grid scenario, the simplest kind of example of power consists in the
power of the local or global administrator to give to common users the possibility to
access to a resource. Particularly, if we consider a role based access control policy, the
Grid administrator has the power to give to the common users, under request, a new role
which makes him able to access to a resource. Other kinds of powers are, for example,
the power to perform a heavy computation or to memorize a great amount of data.
The notion of power brings to the definition of a structure with the aim to show
the dependencies among agents. In order to define these relations in terms of goals
and powers, we adopt, as said, the methodology of dependence networks as developed
by Conte and Sichman [30]. In this model, an agent is described by a set of prioritized
goals, and there is a global dependence relation that explicates how an agent depends on
other agents for fulfilling its goals. For example, dep({a, b}, {c, d}) = {{g1, g2}, {g3}}
expresses that the set of agents {a, b} depends on the set of agents {c, d} to see to their
goals {g1, g2} or {g3}. For each agent we add a priority order on its goals, and we say
that agent a gives higher priority to goal g1 than to goal g2, written as {g1} >(a) {g2},
if the agent tries to achieve goal g1 before it tries to achieve g2. In other words, it gives
more attention to g1 than to g2. A dependence network is defined as follows:
Definition 6 (Dependence Networks (DN)).
A dependence network is a tuple 〈A,G, dep,≥〉 where:
– A is a set of agents;
– G is a set of goals;
– dep : 2A × 2A → 22G is a function that relates with each pair of sets of agents all
the sets of goals on which the first depends on the second.
– ≥: A → 2G × 2G is for each agent a total pre-order on goals which occur in
his dependencies: G1 ≥ (a)G2 implies that ∃B,C ⊆ A such that a ∈ B and
G1, G2 ∈ depend(B,C).
Dependence networks represent our first modeling activity, the dependency model-
ing, consisting in the identification of the dependencies among the agents and among
the roles. In the early requirements phase, we model the dependencies among the agents
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and the roles associated to the agents of the organization. In this way, we represent the
domain stakeholders and we model them using the multiagent paradigm with the ad-
dition of the normative component with its related concepts. These dependencies are
based both on goals and institutional goals. In the phase of late requirements, the same
kind of approach is followed but the agents involved in the dependence network are
those of the future system. A graphical representation of the model obtained follow-
ing the dependency modeling is built following the legend of Figure 3 which describes
the agents (depicted as white circles), the roles (depicted as black circles), the agents
assigned to roles (depicted as grey circles), the agents’/roles’ goals (depicted as white
rectangles) and the dependency among agents (one arrowed line connecting two agents
with the addition of a label which represents the goal on which there is the dependency).
For simplicity, the legend considers the dependency only among agents but these de-
pendencies can be also among roles or agents assigned to roles.
Fig. 3. The legend of the graphical representation of the modeling activities of depen-
dency and dynamic dependency.
We present a first example of modeling a virtual organization based on a Grid net-
work containing only the notions of the agent view.
Example 6. Considering a Grid composed by the nodes of Figure 1, we can imagine
to view each node as an agent and we can form the following dependence network
DN = 〈A,G, dep,≥〉:
1. Agents A = {n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6};
2. Goals G = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6};
3. dep({n1}, {n2}) = {{g1}}: agent n1 depends on agent n2 to achieve the goal
{g1}: to save the file comp.log;
dep({n2}, {n3}) = {{g2}}: agent n2 depends on agent n3 to achieve the goal
{g2}: to run the file mining.mat ;
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dep({n3}, {n1}) = {{g5}}: agent n3 depends on agent n1 to achieve the goal
{g5}: to save the file satellite.jpg;
dep({n4}, {n6}) = {{g3}}: agent n4 depends on agent n6 to achieve the goal
{g3}: to run the file results.mat ;
dep({n6}, {n5}) = {{g4}}: agent n6 depends on agent n5 to achieve the goal
{g4}: to save the file satellite.mpeg;
dep({n5}, {n3}) = {{g6}}: agent n5 depends on agent n3 to achieve the goal
{g6}: to have the authorization to open the file dataJune.mat ;
Fig. 4. Dependence Network of Example 6.
Example 6 shows the dependence network based on a simple Grid example com-
posed by six agents. The kind of dependencies are all related to the agent view and
they always refer to material goals and not to the institutional ones. This dependence
network aims to give a different representation of the system which can be used, for ex-
ample, for the design of the Grid network. Using dependence networks as methodology
to model a system advantage us from different points of view. First, they are abstract,
so on the one hand they can be used for example for conceptual modeling, simulation,
design and formal analysis. Second, they are used in high level design languages, like
TROPOS [10], so they can be used also in software implementation.
4 Dynamic Dependency Modeling
In this section, we answer to the following subquestions: How to extend dependence
networks to build a new modeling activity, called dynamic dependency modeling, able
to model the dynamics intrinsic to the notions of the institutional view? And, how to
model coalitions in dependence networks?
In multiagent environments, autonomous agents may need to cooperate in order
to fulfill their goals. Each group of agents may have different degrees of efficiency
in the achievement of its own goals due to differing capabilities of its members. A
requirements analysis model has to consider also the possible presence of groups of
agents collaborating to each other. We call these groups coalitions. In this section, we
introduce the concept of coalition in the NorMAS-RE conceptual metamodel.
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4.1 Dynamic Dependence Networks
In Section 3, we introduced the different views composing our conceptual metamodel.
On the one hand, we have the agent view where one of the main features is that, since
agents are autonomous by definition, no goals and skills can be added to an agent. On
the other hand, we have the institutional view where the institutional goals, skills and
rules can be added to role, always maintaining the assumption of agents’ autonomy.
The main changes that can occur thanks to the introduction of the institutional view
during the system’s evolution are the addition or deletion of an igoal, of an iskill
and of an irule. These additions and deletions change the number of dependencies
and the agents involved in them, passing from a dependence network to another one.
This change can be represented by means of dynamic dependence networks. We extend
Sichman and Conte’s [30] theory for conditional dependencies, in which agents can
create or destroy dependencies by introducing or removing powers and goals of agents.
Goals can be introduced if goals are conditional, or when the agent can create normative
goals by creating obligations for the other agents. Otherwise, if an iskill or an irule is
introduced, we have the representation of permissions since these additions allow the
role to perform a wider number of actions to achieve its goals.
Dependence networks are used to specify early requirements in the TROPOS method-
ology [10], and to model and reason about the interactions among agents in multiagent
systems. Dynamic dependence networks have been firstly introduced by Caire et al.
[11] and then treated in Boella et al. [6], in which a dependency between agents de-
pends on the actions of other agents and, in particular, agents can delete the goals of the
other ones. Here we distinguish “negative” dynamic dependencies where a dependency
exists unless it is removed by a set of agents due to removal of a goal or ability of an
agent, and “positive” dynamic dependencies where a dependency may be added due to
the power of a third set of agents. Dynamic dependency modeling represents the second
activity modeling for requirements analysis of the system using NorMAS-RE.
Definition 7 (Dynamic Dependence Networks (DDN)).
A dynamic dependence network is a tuple 〈A,G, dyndep−, dyndep+,≥〉 where:
– A is a set of agents;
– G is a set of goals;
– dyndep− : A×2A×2A → 22G is a function that relates with each triple of a agent
and two sets of agents all the sets of goals in which the first depends on the second,
unless the third deletes the dependency.
– dyndep+ : A×2A×2A → 22G is a function that relates with each triple of a agent
and two sets of agents all the sets of goals on which the first depends on the second,
if the third creates the dependency.
– ≥: A → 2G × 2G is for each agent a total pre-order on goals which occur in
his dependencies: G1 ≥ (a)G2 implies that ∃B,C ⊆ A such that a ∈ B and
G1, G2 ∈ dyndep−(a,B,C) or G1, G2 ∈ dyndep+(a,B,C).
The static dependencies are defined by dep(a,B) = dyndep−(a,B, ∅).
A graphical representation of the model obtained following the dynamic dependency
modeling activity is built following the legend of Figure 3 which describes the sign of
14
the dynamic dependency (depicted as a black square) and the dynamic dependency
among agents (depicted as one arrowed line connecting two agents with the addition of
a label which represents the goal on which there is the dependency and another arrowed
dotted line with the sign’s label connecting an agent to the arrowed plain line that can
be deleted or added by this agent).
Example 7. Considering a Grid composed by the nodes of Figure 1 and the depen-
dence network of Example 6, we can form the following dynamic dependence network
DDN = 〈A,G, dyndep−, dyndep+,≥〉:
1. Agents A = {n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6};
2. Goals G = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6};
3. dep({n1}, {n2}) = {{g1}}: agent n1 depends on agent n2 to achieve the goal
{g1}: to save the file comp.log;
dep({n2}, {n3}) = {{g2}}: agent n2 depends on agent n3 to achieve the goal
{g2}: to run the file mining.mat ;
dep({n3}, {n1}) = {{g5}}: agent n3 depends on agent n1 to achieve the goal
{g5}: to save the file satellite.jpg;
dep({n4}, {n6}) = {{g3}}: agent n4 depends on agent n6 to achieve the goal
{g3}: to run the file results.mat ;
dep({n6}, {n5}) = {{g4}}: agent n6 depends on agent n5 to achieve the goal
{g4}: to save the file satellite.mpeg;
dyndep−(n5, {n3}, {n6}) = {{g6}}: agent n5 does not depend on agent n3 to
achieve the goal {g6} (to have the authorization to open the file dataJune.mat), if it
is deleted by agent n6;
dyndep+(n5, {n4}, {n6}) = {{g6}}: agent n5 depends on agent n4 to achieve the
goal {g6} (to have the authorization to open the file dataJune.mat), if it is created
by agent n6;
Fig. 5. Dynamic Dependence Network of Example 7.
Example 7 presents the dynamic dependence network of the Grid scenario. We can
note that in this network each agent has its associated role since all the nodes are grey
ones. Suppose to have a Grid network composing a virtual organization where the local
VO administrator is agent n6. Agent n6 has delegated the power to give the authoriza-
tion to access to the files of the VO to agent n3 but now, since, for example, this node
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became not safe, the VO administrator has to delegate this power to another node and it
chooses node n4. The dynamic dependence network reflects these actions and thus we
have one dynamic dependency for the deletion and another one for the addition.
4.2 Coalitions in Dynamic Dependence Networks
In a multiagent system, we can characterize three different notions of coalitions. A
coalition can be defined in dependence networks, based on the idea that to be part of a
coalition, every agent has to contribute something, and has to get something out of it.
Roughly speaking, a coalition can be formed when there is a cycle of dependencies (the
definition of coalitions is more complicated due to the fact that an agent can depend
on a set of agents, see below). We show how dependence networks can be used in the
requirements analysis for coalitions’ evolution, by assuming that goals are maintenance
goals rather than achievement goals, which give us automatically a longer term and
more dynamic perspective.
A coalition can be represented by a set of dependencies, represented by C(a,B,G)
where a is an agent, B is a set of agents and G is a set of goals. Intuitively, the coalition
agrees that for each C(a,B,G) part of the coalition, the set of agents B will see to the
goal G of agent a. Otherwise, the set of agents B may be removed from the coalition
or be sanctioned. The three notions of coalitions defined below make a distinction be-
tween the coalitions which cannot be attacked by the others with addition or removal
of dynamic dependencies and thus which are actually formed, vulnerable coalitions of
which the existence can be destroyed by the deletion of dynamic dependencies and, fi-
nally, potential coalitions, those coalitions which can be formed depending on additions
and deletions of dynamic dependencies.
Definition 8 (Coalition).
Let A be a set of agents and G be a set of goals. A coalition function is a partial function
C : A × 2A × 2G such that {a | C(a,B,G)} = {b | b ∈ B,C(a,B,G)}, the set of
agents profiting from the coalition is the set of agents contributing to it.
Let 〈A,G, dyndep−, dyndep+,≥〉 be a dynamic dependence network, and dep the
associated static dependencies.
1. A coalition function C is a coalition if ∃a ∈ A,B ⊆ A,G′ ⊆ G such that
C(a,B,G′) implies G′ ∈ dep(a,B). These coalitions which cannot be destroyed
by addition or deletion of dependencies by agents in other coalitions.
2. A coalition function C is a vulnerable coalition if it is not a coalition and ∃a ∈
A,D,B ⊆ A,G′ ⊆ G such that C(a,B,G′) implies G′ ∈ ∪Ddyndep−(a,B,D).
Coalitions which do not need new goals or abilities, but whose existence can be
destroyed by removing dependencies.
3. A coalition function C is a potential coalition if it is not a coalition or a vulnerable
coalition and ∃a ∈ A,D,B ⊆ A,G′ ⊆ G such that C(a,B,G′) implies
G′ ∈ ∪D(dyndep−(a,B,D) ∪G′ ∈ dyndep+(a,B,D))
Coalitions which could be created or which could evolve if new abilities or goals
would be created by agents of other coalitions on which they dynamically depend.
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Example 8. Example 7 presents two different coalitions. On the one hand, we have a
real coalition composed by agents n1, n2 and n3. On the other hand, we have a potential
coalition, such as a coalition which could be formed if agent n6 really performs the
dynamic addition making agent n5 dependent on agent n4.
Fig. 6. The legend of the graphical representation of the modeling activities of dynamic
dependency representing coalitions, potential coalitions and vulnerable coalitions.
These three notions of coalitions represent in the NorMAS-RE model the constraints
for coalitions based on the dynamic dependency modeling. The graphical representation
of the coalition model is depicted in Figure 6 which describes coalitions (depicted as
sets of agents and dependencies included in a dotted circle) and vulnerable and potential
coalitions (depicted as sets of agents and dependencies in a circle in which one or more
of these dependencies can be added or deleted by another agent with a labeled dynamic
dependency). There are various further refinements of the notion of coalition. For ex-
ample, Boella et al. [4] look for minimal coalitions. In this paper we do not consider
these further refinements.
5 Conditional Dependency Modeling
In this section, we answer to the subquestions how to introduce obligations in depen-
dence networks defining a new modeling activity, the conditional dependency modeling
and how to define new constraints for the coalitions’ representation for this new kind of
networks.
Normative multiagent systems are “sets of agents (human or artificial) whose inter-
actions can fruitfully be regarded as norm-governed; the norms prescribe how the agents
ideally should and should not behave. [...] Importantly, the norms allow for the possi-
bility that actual behavior may at times deviate from the ideal, i.e., that violations of
obligations, or of agents’ rights, may occur" [13]. An obligation is a requirement which
must be fulfilled to take some course of action, whether legal or moral. The notion of
conditional obligation with an associated sanction is the base of the so called regulative
17
norms. Obligations are defined in terms of goals of the agent and both the recognition of
the violation and the application of the sanctions are the result of autonomous decisions
of the agent. The association of obligations with violations or sanctions is inspired by
Anderson’s reduction of deontic logic to alethic logic [1].
A well-known problem in the study of deontic logic is the representation of contrary-
to-duty structures, situations in which there is a primary obligation and what we might
call a secondary obligation, coming into effect when the primary one is violated [23]. A
natural effect coming from contrary-to-duty obligations is that obligations pertaining to
a particular point in time cease to hold after they have been violated since this violation
makes every possible evolution in which the obligation is fulfilled inaccessible. A clas-
sical example of contrary-to-duty obligations is given by the so called “gentle murder”
by Forrester [18] which says “do not kill, but if you kill, kill gently”.
The introduction of norms in dependence networks to present a new modeling activ-
ity is based on the necessity to design systems based on norms, particularly obligations.
An example of these real applications is due to the introduction of obligations in vir-
tual Grid-based organizations [38] where obligations, as shown in Section 2, are used
to enforce the authorization decisions. NorMAS-RE introduces obligations and asso-
ciates to the violation of these obligations, sanctions and secondary obligations. This is
a new design model since, in approaches like [38], obligations are considered simply
as tasks that have to be fulfilled when an authorization is accepted/denied while in ap-
proaches like [22], the failure in fulfilling the obligation incurs a sanction but there is
no secondary obligation.
The first step toward the introduction of obligations directly in dependence networks
is to refine the two notions of goal introduced in Section 3. Physical goals are those
goals proper of the agent, e.g., in the Grid scenario these are the personal goals of
the users of the system, while institutional goals represent those goals associated to a
particular role and not to a single agent, e.g., in the Grid scenario, a VO member node
has the goal to obtain an authorization to access to a particular file of another node. The
introduction of obligations underlines the necessity to introduce a new kind of goal, the
normative goals. These goals originate from norms and they represent the obligation
itself. We define a new set of normative concepts, based on Boella et al. [3] model of
obligations, and we group them in a new view, called the normative view. The normative
view is composed by a set of norms N and three main functions, oblig, sanct and ctd
representing obligations, sanctions and contrary to duty obligations. A portion of the
NorMAS-RE metamodel concerning some of the main concepts is shown the UML
class diagram of Figure 12.
Definition 9 (Normative View).
Let the agent view 〈A,F,G,X, goals : A → 2G, skills : A → 2X , rules : 2X → 2G〉
and the institutional view 〈RL, IF,RG,X, igoals : RL → 2RG, iskills : RL →
2X , irules : 2X → 2IF 〉, the normative view is a tuple 〈A,G,RG,N, oblig, sanct, ctd〉
where:
– A is a set of agents, G is a set of goals, RG is a set of institutional goals;
– N is a set of norms;
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– the function oblig : N ×A → 2G∪RG is a function that associates with each norm
and agent, the goals and institutional goals the agent must achieve to fulfill the
norm. Assumption: ∀n ∈ N and a ∈ A, oblig(n, a) ∈ power({a}).
– the function sanct : N × A → 2G∪RG is a function that associates with each
norm and agent the goals and institutional goals that will not be achieved if the
norm is violated by agent a. Assumption: for each B ⊆ A and H ∈ power(B) that
(∪a∈AV (n, a)) ∩H = ∅.
– the function ctd : N × A → 2G∪RG is a function that associates with each norm
and agent the goals and institutional goals that will become the new goals the agent
has to achieve if the norm is violated by agent a. Assumption:∀n ∈ N and a ∈ A,
ctd(n, a) ∈ power({a}).
Normative goals represent a subset of the union of the personal and institutional
goals presented in the agent view and in the institutional view. In Figure 7 the new con-
ceptual metamodel of our model is provided. In this enlarged version of the conceptual
metamodel the notions of obligation, sanction and secondary obligation are added.
Fig. 7. The new NorMAS-RE conceptual metamodel.
To model obligations, we introduce a set of norms, we associate with each norm
the set of agents that has to fulfill it, and for each norm we represent how to fulfill it,
and what happens when it is not fulfilled. In particular, we relate norms to goals in the
following two ways. First, we associate with each norm n a set of goals and institutional
goals oblig(n) ⊆ G ∪ RG. Achieving these normative goals oblig(n) means that the
norm n has been fulfilled; not achieving these goals means that the norm is violated.
We assume that every normative goal can be achieved by the group, i.e., the group
has the power to achieve it. Second, we associate with each norm a set of goals and
institutional goals sanct(n) ⊆ G ∪ RG which will not be achieved if the norm is
violated (i.e., when the goals resulted from the norm are not achieved) and it represents
the sanction associated with the norm. We assume that the group of agents does not have
the power to achieve these goals. Third, we associate with each norm (called primary
obligation) another norm (called secondary obligation) represented as a set of goals and
institutional goals ctd(n) ⊆ G ∪RG that has to be fulfilled if the primary obligation is
violated.
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Current work on normative systems’ formalizations is declarative in nature, focused
on the expressiveness of the norms, the definition of formal semantics and the verifi-
cation of consistency of a given set. Our approach to norms, using the methodology of
dependence networks, is different and is based on the definition of conditional depen-
dence networks. Our aim is not to present a new theorem that, using norms semantics,
checks whether a given interaction protocol complies with norms. We are more inter-
ested in considering, in the context of requirements analysis, how agents’ behaviour is
effected by norms and in analyzing how to constraint the design of coalitions’ evolution
thanks to a normative system. There are two main assumptions in our approach. First
of all we assume that norms can sometimes be violated by agents in order to keep their
autonomy. The violation of norms is handled by sanctions and contrary to duty mech-
anisms. Second, we assume that, from the institutional perspective, the internal state
of the external agents is neither observable nor controllable but the institutional state
or public state of the external agents is note since linked to the role associated to the
external agent and it can be changed by the agents having this power. Thus, we cannot
avoid a forbidden action associated to a goal by a particular rule and we cannot impose
an obligatory action in the goals of the agents.
In Section 4, we introduced dynamic dependence networks as a development of the
model of dependence networks. In dynamic dependence networks, an agent creates the
dependency either creating the obligation, i.e., he creates a new institutional goal for
another agent, or creating the power to achieve a goal. In this section, we define a new
modeling activity, called conditional dependency modeling, to support the early and
late requirements analysis of a system representing obligations and, in particular, sanc-
tions and contrary-to-duty obligations. Conditional dependence networks are defined as
follows:
Definition 10 (Conditional Dependence Networks (CDN)).
A conditional dependence network is a tuple 〈A,G, cdep, odep, sandep, ctddep〉 where:
– A is a set of agents;
– G is a set of goals;
– cdep : 2A × 2A → 22G is a function that relates with each pair of sets of agents all
the sets of goals on which the first depends on the second.
– odep : 2A × 2A → 22G is a function representing a dependency based on obliga-
tions that relates with each pair of sets of agents all the sets of goals on which the
first depends on the second.
– sandep ⊆ (OBL ⊆ (2A × 2A × 22G)) × (SANCT ⊆ (2A × 2A × 22G)) is
a function relating obligations to the dependency which represent their sanctions.
Assumption: SANCT ∈ cdep and OBL ∈ odep.





)) is a function
relating obligations to the dependency which represent their secondary obligations.
Assumption: OBL1, OBL2 ∈ odep and OBL1 ∩OBL2 = ∅.
The graphical representation of the model obtained following the conditional de-
pendency modeling activity is built following the legend of Figure 8 which describes
the obligation-based dependency (depicted as a striped arrowed line), the obligation-
based dependency with the associated sanction expressed as conditional dependency
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(depicted as a striped arrowed line representing the obligation connected to a common
arrowed line representing the sanction by a striped line) and the obligation-based de-
pendency with the associated secondary obligation (depicted as a striped arrowed line
representing the primary obligation connected to another striped arrowed line represent-
ing the secondary obligation by a striped line). The two functions ctddep and sandep
are graphically represented as the striped line connecting the obligation to the sanction
or to the secondary obligation.
Fig. 8. The legend of the graphical representation of the modeling activity of conditional
dependency.
Example 9. Considering Grid’s nodes of Example 7, depicted in Figure 5, we can add
two constraints for the requirements analysis phase under the form of obligations and
we can build the following conditional dependence network CDN = 〈A,G, cdep, odep, sandep, ctddep〉:
1. Agents A = {n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6};
2. Goals G = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7, g8};
3. cdep({n1}, {n2}) = {{g1}}: agent n1 depends on agent n2 to achieve the goal
{g1}: to save the file comp.log;
dep({n2}, {n3}) = {{g2}}: agent n2 depends on agent n3 to achieve the goal
{g2}: to run the file mining.mat ;
dep({n3}, {n1}) = {{g5}}: agent n3 depends on agent n1 to achieve the goal
{g5}: to save the file satellite.jpg;
dep({n4}, {n6}) = {{g3}}: agent n4 depends on agent n6 to achieve the goal
{g3}: to run the file results.mat ;
dep({n6}, {n5}) = {{g4}}: agent n6 depends on agent n5 to achieve the goal
{g4}: to save the file satellite.mpeg;
dep({n5}, {n4}) = {{g6}}: agent n5 depends on agent n4 to achieve the goal
{g6}: to have the authorization to open the file dataJune.mat ;
odep({n2}, {n1}) = {{g7}}: agent n2 is obliged to perform goal {g7} concerning
agent n1 : to run the file mining.mat with the highest priority;
odep({n4}, {n5}) = {{g8}}: agent n4 is obliged to perform goal {g8} concerning
agent n5 : to share results of the running of file dataJune.mat with agent n5;
21
odep({n4}, {n6}) = {{g8}}: agent n4 is obliged to perform goal {g8} concerning
agent n6 : to share results of the running of file dataJune.mat with agent n6;
sandep{(({n2}, {n1}) = {{g7}}, ({n1}, {n2}) = {{g1}})};
ctddep{(({n4}, {n5}) = {{g8}}, ({n4}, {n6}) = {{g8}})};
Example 9 shows the subsequent step after the deletion and the insertion of the
two dynamic dependencies of Example 7. In this situation, following the definition of
coalition, we can imagine to have two local coalitions composing a virtual organization,
the first one composed by nodes n1, n2, n3 and the other composed by nodes n4, n5
and n6. Since these two subsets of the virtual organization have to work with a good
cohesion then it is possible to insert some constraints, made clear by obligations. The
first obligation consists in giving the highest priority to, for example, a computation
for an agent composing the same local coalition as you. This first obligation is related
to a sanction if it is violated. This link is made clear by the function sandep and it
represents the deletion of a dependence concerning a goal of the agent that has to fulfill
the obligation. The second obligation, instead, is related to a secondary obligation and
it means that the agent has to share the results of a computation with a member of its
local coalition but, if it does not fulfill this obligation then it has to share these results
with another member of the local coalition.
Fig. 9. Conditional Dependence Network of Example 9.
In this new kind of network, if a goal, set by an obligation, is not fulfilled then the
conditional dependency related to this obligation has two possible developments: if a
sanction is associated to the norm, a goal cannot be achieved and thus the conditional
dependency related to that goal has to be deleted or, if a contrary-to-duty obligation,
which means a secondary obligation, is associated to the norm then the conditional
dependency related the goals set by this secondary obligation has to be added. We rep-
resent obligations, sanctions and contrary-to-duty obligations as tuples of dependencies
related to each other. An obligation is viewed as a particular kind of dependency and
it is related to other dependencies: dependencies due to sanctions and dependencies
due to secondary obligations. In the first case, we have that sanctions are common de-
pendencies, already existing inside the system that, because of their connection with
the obligation, can be deleted. In particular, if the obligation is not fulfilled, then the
dependency related to the obligation with the role to be its sanction is deleted. In the
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second case, instead, a primary obligation is related to a number of secondary obliga-
tions. A graphical representation of the evolutions of conditional dependence networks
is provided in Figure 10:
Fig. 10. The evolution of conditional dependence networks.
In the first case, if the obligation is fulfilled and it is linked to a sanction then the
obligation can be removed and also the connection among the obligation and the sanc-
tion. The only dependency that remains in the network is the one related to the sanction
that passes from being a conditional dependency to a common dependency. If the obli-
gation is not fulfilled then it is deleted and the deletion involves also the conditional
dependency representing the sanction. The sanction consists exactly the deletion of this
conditional dependency. In the second case, if the obligation is fulfilled and it is linked
to a secondary obligation then the obligation is deleted and also the secondary obliga-
tion is deleted since there is no reason to already exists. If the obligation, instead, is not
fulfilled then the primary obligation is deleted but the secondary obligation not. Note
that in Figure 10 are depicted only the conditional dependencies and the obligational
dependencies and not all the other kinds of possible dependencies of the network.
Two case studies: transactions and personal norms. In this section, we analyze two
particular case studies using our representation of obligations. The first one consists
in transactions. A transaction is an agreement or communication carried out between
separate entities, often involving the exchange of items of value, such as information,
goods, services and money. This is the basic idea underlying norm emergence. Let us
consider the case of two agents a and b, where a is the buyer and b is the seller. If we
consider two goals such as g1: book sent by the seller b to the buyer a and g2: money
transferred from the buyer a to the seller b, we have the dependence network depicted
in Figure 11-(b). The two agents depend on each other to achieve their goals, the seller
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is waiting for its payment and the buyer is waiting for its good. When introduced, our
representation of obligations allows to arrive to a very simplified version of the network
in which each agent depends on itself to not violate the obligation. The dependence
network derived after the norm creation is much more simpler than the previous one
representing however the same concepts. This simplified version of the network, repre-
senting obligations, can be used for the design and, in particular for the requirements
analysis phases, of the multiagent system allowing to individuate in a simpler way the
obligation present in it, without the necessity to take into account all the sets of depen-
dencies on goals of the network.
The second case study makes more explicit this necessity to simplify the depen-
dence network with the aim to individuate the obligations is the case of personal norms.
In the real life, everybody’s life is regulated by personal norms like not kill and not
leave trash on the roads. These norms are referred to every person and it seems that
everyone depends on the others to achieve these goals that can be represented as goals
of the whole society. It is similar to the social delegation cycle: do not do the others
what you do not want them to do to you. In this case, we can represent the dependence
network as a full connected graph since every agent depends on all the other agents, for
example to not be killed. The simplification brought by the representation of obligations
is relevant, as can be seen in Figure 11-(a).
Fig. 11. Case studies: personal norms and transactions.
5.1 Coalitions in Conditional Dependence Networks
In this Section, we answer to the subquestion: What constrains are set by obligations to
the conditional dependency modeling concerning coalitions. In Section 4, we presented
three different kinds of coalitions: existing coalitions composed by common dependen-
cies, vulnerable coalitions composed by one or more arcs linked to a dynamic depen-
dency of removal and, finally, potential coalitions composed by one or more arcs linked
to a dynamic dependency of addition. The new kind of dependence networks, condi-
tional dependence networks, has to be taken into account when a system is described
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in terms of coalitions. This means that coalitions, vulnerable coalitions and potential
coalitions can change depending on the conditional dependencies set by the obligations
of the system. A coalition has to consider also sanctions and secondary obligations,
according to these constraints:
Definition 11 (Constraints for Conditional Dependency Modeling). Let A be a set
of agents and G be a set of goals. A coalition function is a partial function C ⊆ A ×
2A × 2G such that {a | C(a,B,G)} = {b | b ∈ B,C(a,B,G)}, the set of agents
profiting from the coalition is the set of agents contributing to it.
Introducing conditional dependence networks, the following constraints arise:
– ∀(dep1, dep2) ∈ sandep, dep2 /∈ C if and only if dep1 /∈ C. If the obligation,
associated to the dependency dep1 is not part of the coalition C then also the
sanction dep2 associated to the obligation is not part of the coalition C. If the
obligation, associated to the dependency dep1 is part of the coalition C then also
the sanction dep2 associated to the obligation is part of the coalition C.
– ∀(dep1, dep2) ∈ ctddep, dep2 ∈ C if and only if dep1 /∈ C. If the primary obli-
gation, associated to the dependency dep1 is not part of the coalition C then the
secondary obligation dep2 is part of the coalition C. If the primary obligation,
associated to the dependency dep1 is part of the coalition C then the secondary
obligation dep2 is not part of the coalition C.
Example 10. Let us consider the conditional dependence network of Example 9. Ap-
plying these constraints, we have that if the obligation on goal g7 is fulfilled then the
local coalition composed by agents n1, n2 and n3 already exists since the dependency
associated to the sanction is not deleted. If the obligation on goal g7 is not fulfilled then
the obligation is deleted but also the sanction is deleted and the coalition does not exist
any more. Concerning the second local coalition, if the obligation is fulfilled then both
the primary and the secondary obligation are removed but if the primary obligation is
not fulfilled then the secondary obligation is part of the local coalition composed by
agents n4, n5 and n6.
5.2 Regulation of Stability
In game theoretical approaches [27], stability may be taken into account when distribut-
ing the payoff of the coalition among its members. Roughly speaking, payoffs should be
divided in a fair way to maintain stability. The core, for example, provides a concept of
stability for coalitional games and a payoff is in the core only if no coalition has an in-
centive to break off from the grand coalition and form its own group. Other approaches
of the same kind are provided by the other solution concepts such as the Shapley value
and the nucleous. Given a previously formed coalitional configuration, game theory
usually concentrates on checking its stability or its fairness and on the calculation of
the corresponding payments. But game theory rarely takes into consideration the spe-
cial properties of a multi-agent environment such as, for example, goal-based agents.
Coalitions change dynamically due to rapid changes in the tasks and resource availabil-
ity, and therefore relying on the initial configurations is misleading.
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Fig. 12. The UML class diagram specifying the main concepts of the NorMAS-RE
metamodel.
In this section, we present a first step toward the definition of a notion of stability for
coalitions individuated in the context of one of our three modeling activities. The im-
portance of the definition of a notion of stability for the modeling analysis, particularly
for the requirements analysis phases, is related to the issues of security and efficiency.
For example, in the Grid scenario, it is very important to have the guarantee that the two
subsets composing the virtual organization are stable in the sense that they represent se-
cure and efficient “group" of nodes with a great internal cohesion. This approach has the
aim to present the problem of coalitions’ stability from a different point of view respect
the point of view presented in game theoretical approaches. The main difference is in
the notion of agent used in the NorMAS-RE model, such as not an agent viewed only
as a utility maximizer but a goal-based agent. In this sense, our definition of agent is
more complex and with many facets than the agents presented in game theory. Starting
from Section 4, where we distinguished among three different kinds of coalitions, we
can start to define coalitions’ stability in the following way:
Definition 12 (Coalitions’ stability). A coalition C is called stable if ∃a ∈ A,B ⊆
A,G′ ⊆ G such that C(a,B,G′) implies G′ ∈ dep(a,B) and ¬(∃a ∈ A,D,B ⊆
A,G′ ⊆ G such that C(a,B,G′) implies G′ ∈ ∪Ddyndep−(a,B,D)). A coalition is
stable if it is formed by dependencies relying its members and there is not the possibility
to delete one these dependencies by another agent, inside or outside the coalition itself.
Conditional dependencies add new possibility to see to the stability of a coalition. In
fact, we can claim that one of the main interests of the agents involved in a coalition is to
maintain its stability. This maintenance can be achieved using norms such as obligations
to regulate the behaviour of the members of the coalition. The use of obligations can
follow two different lines:
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– Obligations to regulate dynamic dependencies: this first kind of obligation is ad-
dressed to each member of a coalition with the aim to avoid, imposing a sanction
or a secondary obligation, the mining of the stability of a coalition. Following the
notion of stability, the first norm of all the agents when they become members of a
coalition is informally: If an agent, member of a coalition, has the power to delete
one or more of the dependencies constituting the coalition itself then it is obliged
to not do this deletion. This norm is addressed only to those agent belonging to
the coalition since, as in real cases, it is always possible for an external agent or
coalition to attack another coalition with the aim to decrease its influence. This
obligation can be linked to sanctions and secondary obligations of different kinds,
such as for example the secondary obligation to create another dependency with the
aim to strengthen the coalition. It is also possible to impose a sanction to the agent,
for example deleting all the dependencies in which it depends on other agents, pre-
venting him to achieve its goals.
– Obligations to regulate agents’ behaviour: this second kind of obligations is not
related to the dependencies and dynamic dependencies describing the system, but
it is addressed to the regulation of the behaviour of the agents depending on their
membership to a coalition. These kind of obligations are of the type If an agent
belongs to a coalition then it has to satisfy first those requests coming from the
other members of the coalition and, only after, requests coming from outsiders.
These rules aim to strengthen the unity of the coalition and to improve the work
inside it.
6 Related work
The related work section is divided into three main sections with the aim to follow bet-
ter the different research lines along which the paper is developed. The three sections
consists in 1) works on agent-based software engineering, 2) works on coalition forma-
tion and coalitions’ evolution taking into account both game theoretical approaches and
social networks ones, 3) works on normative multiagent systems and institutions. The
second section presents also a number of works devoted to the definition of the notion
of stability for coalitions.
6.1 Agent-based software engineering
The idea of focusing the activities that precede the specification of software require-
ments, in order to understand how the intended system will meet organizational goals,
is not new. It has been first proposed in requirements engineering, specifically in Eric
Yu’s work with his i* model [36]. This model has been applied in various application
areas, including requirements engineering, business process re-engineering, and soft-
ware process modeling. The i* model offers actors, goals and actor dependencies as
primitive concepts [35]. The rationale of the i* model is that by doing an earlier analy-
sis, one can capture not only the what or the how, but also the why a piece of software is
developed. This, in turn, supports a more refined analysis of system dependencies and
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encourages a uniform treatment of the system’s functional and non-functional require-
ments. As stated in the introduction and in the paper, the most important example for
our model consists in the TROPOS methodology [10] that aspires to span the overall
software development process, from early requirements to implementation. Other ap-
proaches to software engineering are those of KAOS [15] which covers only the late
requirements phase, GAIA [34] which covers both the late requirements phase and the
architectural design, AAII [21] and MaSE [16] which cover the two phases of archi-
tectural and detailed design, and AUML [2] which covers only the detailed design.
The main difference between these approaches and our approach is in the use at the
same time of the normative multiagent paradigm based on both the notion of institution
and the notion of obligation, the graphical modeling language based on dependencies
among agents and the covering of the very early phases of requirements analysis.
6.2 Coalitions’ formation and evolution
One of the most important issues in the field of multiagent systems concerns the descrip-
tion and formalization of coalition formation. Although there were many approaches
defining coalition formation, to represent different perspectives. Two representative ex-
amples are given by the model of Shehory and Kraus [26] and the one of Sichman and
Conte [29][30]. The approach of Shehory and Kraus [26] is based on the assumption
that autonomous agents in the multiagent environments may need to cooperate in order
to fulfill tasks. They present algorithms that enable the agents to form groups and assign
a task to each group, calling these groups coalitions. However, Shehory and Kraus’ work
considers tasks which are not related to the individual goals of the agents in the coali-
tion and it does not consider the motivations for agents to enter the coalition, nor the
dependencies existing among the agents. They only address cases in which dependen-
cies among tasks are due to competing resources’ requirements or execution precedence
order. Sichman [29], instead, introduces a different point of view. He presents coalition
formation using a dependence-based approach based on the notion of social dependence
introduced by Castelfranchi [14]. This model introduces the notion of dependence sit-
uation, which allows an agent to evaluate the susceptibility of other agents to adopt his
goals, since agents are not necessarily supposed to be benevolent and therefore auto-
matically adopt the goals of each other. In this dependence-based model, coalitions can
be modeled using dependence networks. A definition of coalitions inspired by depen-
dence networks is given by Boella et al. [4]. The authors represent a potential coalition
as a labeled AND-graph of dependencies among agents. These AND-graphs consist of
a set of nodes which denotes the agents involved in the coalition and a set of labeled
arcs.
Coalitions’ stability The work that, to our knowledge, gives a first definition of stabil-
ity is the paper of Zlotkin and Rosenschein [39]. In a task oriented domain, a coalition
can coordinate by redistributing their tasks among themselves. It seems intuitively rea-
sonable that agents in a coalition game should not suffer by coordinating their actions
with a larger group. In other words, if you take two disjoint coalitions, the utility they
can derive together should not be less than the sum of their separate utilities, at the
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worst, they could coordinate by ignoring each other. This property is called superad-
ditivity. This work introduce the notion of stability of a coalition using the concept of
superadditivity. The stability condition relates to the payoff vector that assigns to each
agent a utility. There are three levels of stability conditions: individual, group and coali-
tion rationality. Individual rationality means that no individual agent would like to opt
out of the full coalition, group rationality means that the group as a whole would not
prefer any other payoff vector over this vector and coalition rationality means that no
group of agents should have an incentive to deviate from the full coalition and create a
subcoalition for each subset of agents. To ensure stability, they need to find a consensus
mechanism that is resistant to any coalition manipulation. Another work on this issue
is from Sandholm and Lesser [24]. In this paper, the optimal coalition structure and its
stability are significantly affected by the agents algorithms performance profiles and the
unit cost of computation.
6.3 Normative multiagent systems and institutions
An example of normative multiagent system introducing obligations has been done by
Boella and van der Torre [7]. In this work, to model obligations they introduce a set of
norms, associated with each norm the set of agents that has to fulfill it and what happens
when it is not fulfilled. In particular, they relate norms to goals in the following two
ways. First, each norm is associated to a set of goals. Achieving these normative goals
means that the norm has been fulfilled; not achieving these goals means that the norm
is violated. They assume that every normative goal can be achieved by the group, that
means that the group has the power to achieve it. The second point is that each norm
is associated to another set of goals which will not be achieved if the norm is violated,
this is the sanction associated to the norm. They assume that the group of agents does
not have the power to achieve these goals, otherwise they would avoid the sanction.
An interesting approach to the application of the notion of institution to multiagent
systems is defined in Sierra et al. [31]. Electronic Institutions (EIs) provide the vir-
tual analogue of human organizations in which agents, playing different organizational
roles, interact to accomplish individual and organizational goals. EIs introduce sets of
artificial constraints that articulate and coordinate interactions among agents. In this ap-
proach, roles are defined as patterns of behavior and are divided into institutional roles
(those enacted to achieve and guarantee institutional rules) and non-institutional roles
(those requested to conform to institutional rules). Like us, the purpose of their norma-
tive rules is to affect the behavior of agents by imposing obligations or prohibitions.
Another approach to EIs is given by Bogdanovych et al. [8]. In this approach they
propose the use of 3D Virtual Worlds to include humans into software systems with a
normative regulation of interactions. The normative part can be seen as defining which
actions require an institutional verification assuming that any other action is allowed.
Inside the 3D Interaction Space, an institution is represented as a building where the
participants are represented as avatars. Once they enter the building their actions are
validated against the specified institutional rules. In the last two works, unlike us, the
concept of institution is presented by a practical approach without a formal definition of
the concept of institution and a description of its dynamics while they are similar to our
one in the establishment of a different level of the organization related to the institution.
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The problem of dynamic institutions is treated in Bou et al. [9] as an extension to
EIs definition with the capability to decide in an autonomous way how to answer dy-
namically to changing circumstances through norm adaptation and changes in institu-
tional agents. The assumption for EIs to adapt is that EIs seek specific goals. The paper
presents the normative transition function that maps a set of norms into another one. As
our approach, agents participating in the system have social interactions mediated by
the institution and the consequences of these interactions is a change in the institutional
state of an agent. The difference with our approach consists in the definition of the in-
stitution as an entity with own goals, the running example given into the paper is that of
the institution of the Traffic Regulation Authority with the goal to decrease the number
of accidents below a given threshold, and states.
An interesting approach is presented in Vazquez-Salceda et al. [33] where they pro-
pose the Organizational Model for Normative Institutions (OMNI) framework. OMNI
brings together some aspects from two existing frameworks: OperA and HARMONIA.
OperA is a formal specification framework that focuses on the organizational dimension
while HARMONIA is a formal framework to model especially highly regulated elec-
tronic organizations from an abstract level to the final protocols that implement norms.
In OMNI, roles are often dependent on other roles for the realization of their objectives.
Societies establish dependencies and power relations between roles, indicating relation-
ships between roles. These relationships describe, like in our approach, how actors can
interact and contribute to the realization of the objectives of each other.
7 Conclusions
This paper provides a detailed account of NorMAS-RE, a new requirements analysis
model based on the normative multiagent paradigm, following the TROPOS method-
ology [10]. The paper presents and discusses the early and late requirements phases
of systems design. The first part of the paper presents the key concepts of our model
dividing them into three submodels, one representing the agents and their mentalistic
notions of goals and facts, the second representing the roles and their associated notions
of institutional goals and facts and, finally, the third representing the mapping between
agents and roles. The second part of the paper presents our graphical representations for
the three modeling activities by which NorMAS-RE is composed. The three modeling
activities are called dependency modeling, dynamic dependency modeling and condi-
tional dependency modeling and they are based on the notions of institution, obligation,
sanction and secondary obligation. The addition of normative concepts as the last ones
is a relevant improvement to requirements analysis since it allows first to constraint the
construction of the requirements modeling and second to represent systems, as in the
Grid scenario, in which there are explicit obligations regulating the behaviour of the
components composing it. Moreover, the NorMAS-RE model is defined also to model
the requirements analysis phases in a context in which there is the possible presence of
coalitions and we present the first step toward the definition of the notion of coalitions’
stability for our modeling activities.
Our long term objective is to provide a detailed account of the NorMAS-RE model
and to start the development of the other phases of design analysis of a system such
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as architectural and detailed design phases and the implementation phase, as done for
example by the TROPOS methodology. Moreover, the NorMAS-RE model in its current
form is also not suitable for agents requiring advanced reasoning mechanisms for plans,
goals and negotiations. Further extensions will be required to the NorMAS-RE model
to address this class of software applications.
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